Selected works by recent participants Tuomas Tahko, "In Defense of Aristotelian Metaphysics" in Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (2012)
Thomas Hofweber, "Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics" in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (2009)
Kristin Andrews, Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology (forthcoming)
Robert Lurz, Mindreading Animals: The Debate Over What Animals Know about Other Minds (2011)
Shaun Gallagher, Brainstorming: Views and Interviews on the Mind (2008)
Karsten Stueber, "Varieties of Empathy, Neuroscience and the Narrativist Challenge to the Contemporary Theory of Mind Debate" (2012)
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May 12th, 2012
http://www.vimeo.com/38069272
Tuomas Tahko (left) and Thomas Hofweber (right) on the foundations of metaphysics.
If metaphysics is a form of genuine inquiry, then presumably metaphysicians investigate questions of fact. But it seems that for any given type of fact, there is already a discipline that investigates facts of that type. For instance, physicists investigate physical facts; mathematicians investigate mathematical facts—and so on. Perhaps there is a special realm of facts investigated only by metaphysicians, but it is unclear what such facts would be like. Alternatively, perhaps metaphysics plays the role of verifying results obtained in other disciplines, but it is unclear that metaphysicians are qualified to check the work of physicists and mathematicians. So what exactly is it that metaphysicians do? In this episode, Tahko and Hofweber grapple with this question.
Continue reading Tuomas Tahko and Thomas Hofweber
April 24th, 2012
Part 1:
http://www.vimeo.com/39005245
Part 2:
http://www.vimeo.com/39067939
Kristin Andrews (left) and Robert Lurz (right) on animals and mindreading.
In this two-part conversation*, Andrews and Lurz discuss whether (and to what extent) non-human animals are able to mindread, i.e., understand others’ mental states. In Part 1, they begin with a review of the history of inquiry into animal mindreading, and then examine (starting at 28:18) Andrews’s views about the evolutionary origins and explanatory and predictive roles of mindreading. In Part 2, they discuss Lurz’s plans for experimental investigation of animal mindreading (14:54), Andrews’s and Lurz’s differing views of the abilities of great apes (32:49), and the relative importance of fieldwork and laboratory evidence (48:47).
The drawing to which Lurz refers at 18:44 is in this paper (p. 25).
*=The conversation was interrupted by a tech snafu, so we divided the video in two.
Continue reading Kristin Andrews and Robert Lurz
March 14th, 2012
http://www.vimeo.com/38069234
Shaun Gallagher (left) and Karsten Stueber (right) on empathy.
Most people possess a substantial (although also limited) ability to know and understand the actions, intentions, and desires of other people. This ability, some think, is explained by our capacity to empathize with one another. In this conversation, Gallagher and Stueber examine the notion of empathy and its importance for debates in the philosophy of mind. They ask: What is empathy? Is empathy an automatic process, or does it require effort? What are the neurological and psychological processes involved in empathy? Does our ability to empathize provide us with a reliable guide to the contents of others’ minds, or does empathy routinely mislead us?
Continue reading Shaun Gallagher and Karsten Stueber
February 7th, 2012
http://www.vimeo.com/34291298
Katherine Thomson-Jones (left) and George Wilson (right) on cinematic narration.
Some films feature voice-over narration, but most fictional films appear to lack a narrator. And it seems that a narrative requires a narrator. Yet film, like literature, is widely regarded as a narrative art—a story-telling art. So who (if anyone) tells the story conveyed by a film? Relatedly: Perhaps when we engage a fictional film, we imagine that we see the people, places, and events that make up the film’s fictional world. Yet we do not seem to imagine ourselves to be present in the film’s fictional world. (If it’s raining on screen, we do not reach for our umbrellas.) How can we imagine that we see events without imagining that we are present in the same world in which those events occur? In this conversation, Thomson-Jones and Wilson discuss these and other puzzles as they explore the nature and role of narrativity in film.
Continue reading Katherine Thomson-Jones and George Wilson
January 15th, 2012
http://www.vimeo.com/34262759
Mark Alfano (left) and Abrol Fairweather (right) on virtue epistemology.
A long line of virtue ethicists believe that we need to understand the moral virtues—courage, benevolence, temperance, etc.—in order to address core questions in moral philosophy. Lately, there has been a surge of interest in virtue epistmeology, which holds that core questions in epistemology should be addressed in terms of epistemic virtues. In this conversation, Alfano and Fairweather discuss the advantages and challenges of virtue epistemology, with a special focus on issues arising from results in empirical psychology.
Continue reading Mark Alfano and Abrol Fairweather
December 2nd, 2011
http://www.vimeo.com/32531889
Avram Hiller (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on anthropogenic climate change.
Earth’s climate is changing as a result of human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). How much of this is your fault? For instance, suppose you go on a Sunday drive in a gas-guzzling car just for fun. Then have you done any harm? Sinnott-Armstrong argues (starting at 9:43) that such an action is utterly harmless. But Hiller argues that every GHG-emitting activity—even one Sunday drive—is quantifiably harmful. After discussing their disagreement, Hiller and Sinnott-Armstrong consider a range of other philosophical issues related to climate change: the moral significance of nature (25:32); the ethics of species destruction (31:03); the influence of evolution on our moral intuitions (41:33); and the connections between global warming and global poverty (52:54).
Continue reading Avram Hiller and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
November 9th, 2011
http://www.vimeo.com/31510618
Elizabeth Brake (left) and Simon May (right) on marriage.
As same-sex marriage gains acceptance, a greater number of caring relationships enjoy legal recognition. But what about polygamous and polyamorous relationships? What about non-romantic relationships, such as friendships? In this episode, Brake and May discuss Brake’s controversial view that individuals should be allowed to assign the rights and privileges of marriage to whomever they want, so long as the purpose is to support a caring relationship. They also discuss the case for same-sex marriage (4:30), whether legal marriage should be abolished (33:48), caring relationships as Rawlsian primary goods (45:40), and May’s objection to polygamy (54:49).
Read an excerpt from Brake’s forthcoming book, Minimizing Marriage: Morality, Marriage, and the Law.
Announcement: Jeremy Garrett, Elizabeth Brake, Martha Fineman, and Simon May will participate in a group session entitled “After Marriage” at the Eastern APA meeting, Group Session XIII, Fri., Dec. 30, 1:30pm.
Continue reading Elizabeth Brake and Simon May
October 6th, 2011
http://www.vimeo.com/30027569
Owen Flanagan (left) and Alex Rosenberg (right) on the significance of naturalism.
Naturalists believe that the world is scientifically intelligible (at least in principle). Thus, naturalists doubt the reality of anything that cannot fit into a scientific worldview. How discomforting are naturalists’ doubts? Can naturalists coherently regard life as meaningful? Rosenberg is happily pessimistic about the answers to such questions. In this conversation, Rosenberg defends his pessimism, and Flanagan resists it. They discuss whether Darwin banished purpose (17:27), why naturalists get up in the morning (34:30), and morality and politics from a naturalist perspective (49:45), among other topics.
Continue reading Owen Flanagan and Alex Rosenberg
September 18th, 2011
http://www.vimeo.com/28681091
Jason Brennan (left) and Kevin Vallier (right) on political liberalism and religion.
According to some prominent versions of political liberalism, coercive political force is illegitimate unless it is justifiable from every reasonable point of view. But there are many reasonable points of view from which religious beliefs cannot be justified. This seems to mean that religious political convictions are in conflict with political liberalism. However, Vallier resists that conclusion; he thinks that religious reasoning can have a legitimate role in political discourse. In this episode, Brennan and Vallier discuss Vallier’s argument.
Continue reading Jason Brennan and Kevin Vallier
August 22nd, 2011
http://www.vimeo.com/27922390
Matt Bedke (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on ethical intuitions.
Bedke and Sinnott-Armstrong consider the extent to which we can justifiably trust our ethical intuitions. They discuss the analogy between ethical intuitions and color perceptions (2:55), a potential difference between ethical intuitions and non-ethical philosophical intuitions (19:45), Sinnott-Armstrong’s work on framing effects (27:11), and Bedke’s critique of non-naturalist ethical intuitionism (60:44), among other topics.
Continue reading Matt Bedke and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
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